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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 Respondents Charles C. Edgar and Laura D.G. Edgar sued 
Hahnemann University Hospital as conservators of the person and 
estate of their daughter, Shane Edgar, and in their own right, 
alleging that the hospital acted with gross negligence and 
willful misconduct when it failed to protect Shane Edgar from 
being raped forcibly by two male patients.0  During discovery, 
the Edgars requested the patient charts of the two male patients 
who allegedly raped Shane Edgar.  The hospital objected on the 
grounds that the documents were confidential and that it could 
not comply with the request without violating the Pennsylvania 
Mental Health Procedures Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7101, et 
                     
0At oral argument we asked counsel for the Edgars about the 
prudence of including Shane Edgar's name in unsealed court 
documents, in light of the nature of the allegations in the 
underlying case.  The attorney responded that the Edgars had 
chosen not to have their names redacted from court proceedings. 
For this reason, we include names in this opinion. 
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seq. (Purdon's Supp. 1995) ("MHPA").  The district court entered 
a series of orders requiring Hahnemann to provide the court with 
copies of all documents in its possession concerning the two male 
patients for an in camera review, with possible disclosure of the 
information to the parties, their counsel, and their experts, for 
use at trial.  Hahnemann filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
in this court, seeking immediate review of the district court's 
orders.  We will grant Hahnemann's petition for mandamus. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On March 19, 1993, Shane Edgar was admitted to the 
Psychiatric Medical Care Unit of Hahnemann University Hospital in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for observation and evaluation.  That 
same day, an involuntarily committed male psychiatric patient 
sexually harassed Shane; Hahnemann allegedly became aware of the 
incident.  That night, the same male patient, along with another 
involuntarily committed male psychiatric patient, raped Shane in 
the bathroom of her room.0 
 Charles and Laura Edgar filed an action on behalf of 
their daughter and themselves against Hahnemann, alleging that 
the hospital negligently failed to protect their daughter from 
the sexual assault.  Because notice of the danger may be germane 
to their cause of action under Pennsylvania law, the Edgars 
sought discovery from Hahnemann of any information that would 
                     
0We recite the facts as the Edgars allege them.  It should be 
understood, therefore, that our recitation does not constitute 
findings. 
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demonstrate that it was on notice of the two male patients' 
propensity for sexual assault.  Specifically, they sought the 
patient charts of the two men.  The hospital objected on the 
grounds that the documents were confidential and that it could 
not comply with the request without violating the MHPA.  After 
the Edgars moved for sanctions, the district court held a 
conference in an attempt to resolve the dispute.  On April 19, 
1995, the district court denied the Edgars' motion and directed 
that if the dispute was not resolved they could file a more 
specific set of requests for documents, limited by the MHPA. 
 After a final pretrial conference held on May 4, 1995, 
the Edgars filed a motion to compel the production of various 
documents, including the patient charts of the two male patients 
and/or entries on their charts made by a mental health worker, 
and the incident reports regarding the rape.  Again, Hahnemann 
objected on the grounds that the confidentiality of the documents 
required protection under the MHPA.  At the same time, the 
hospital pointed out that redacting the patients' names from the 
charts would not protect the documents' confidentiality because 
the Edgars had information that would allow them to deduce which 
report belonged to which patient. 
 On May 11, 1995, the district court, pursuant to 
section 111 of the MHPA, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7111, denied 
the Edgars' request for the records.  The court also denied the 
motion to compel the notes and chart entries of the mental health 
technician on duty the night of the attack.  The court did, 
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however, order Hahnemann to produce any "incident reports" 
created as a result of the attack, and further ordered that: 
In the event that the only incident reports 
prepared by [the mental health technician] 
are contained in one or both of the treatment 
records of the male patients involved in the 
subject incident, the defendant shall . . . 
submit the treatment records of these two 
patients to the Court, in camera, for a 
determination as to whether § 7111 of the 
MHPA prohibits the discovery of said reports. 
App. at 133.  Hahnemann later informed the court by letter that 
it had disclosed all "incident reports" to the Edgars, and that 
an in camera inspection would not be necessary because the mental 
health technician involved had not prepared such a report. 
 The Edgars filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
May 11 order, emphasizing again that they were seeking 
information as to whether the hospital should be held liable for 
the rape and that they would be willing to accept documents 
edited so as to obscure the identity of the patients.  In 
response, Hahnemann argued that the MHPA was so broad that even 
disclosure of the records to the district court for an in camera 
inspection was prohibited.  Further, it reiterated its argument 
that "[the Edgars] are in possession of information regarding 
these two patients which would unfailingly allow them to identify 
which records pertain to which man, regardless of redaction." 
App. at 167.  On July 10, 1995, the district court entered an 
order stating that its May 11, 1995 order denying the Edgars 
access to the patient charts remained in full force and effect 
and requiring the parties to appear for a conference in chambers 
on July 17, 1995, to discuss the following: 
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[W]hether, in the interest of justice, 
methods might be employed to maintain the 
confidentiality of documents covered by §7111 
of the MHPA in the event the Court should 
order documents concerning the treatment of 
the two male patients who allegedly attacked 
plaintiff Shane Edgar turned over to the 
Court for a determination as to whether said 
documents contain any matter which should 
have put the defendant on notice. 
Edgar v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., No. 94-3515 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 
1995).  On the same day, the district court entered an order 
clarifying the meaning of "incident reports" and reiterating its 
requirement for the production of such reports, including the in 
camera inspection of the patients' records if such reports were 
included therein. 
 At the July 17, 1995 conference, the court decided that 
the hospital should deliver to it copies of all documents 
regarding the two male patients so that it could determine 
whether they contained information bearing on the liability of 
the hospital.  The court thereafter directed the parties to 
submit proposed orders providing for the court to view the 
documents in camera.  In response to the court's request, 
Hahnemann supplied it with a proposed order requiring disclosure 
of the medical records in camera but also containing 
certification language pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed. 
R. App. P. 5, designed to allow immediate appeal from an 
interlocutory order.  The court then entered an order on July 18, 
1995, which did not adopt the section 1292(b) certification 
language but read as follows: 
Within five days . . . Hahnemann University 
Hospital shall deliver to the court copies of 
all documents (including medical and 
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psychiatric records as well as documents 
relating to involuntary commitment) in its 
possession concerning each of the two male 
patients who allegedly attacked Shane Edgar 
on March 19, 1993.  The Court shall make 
every effort to maintain the confidentiality 
of the documents as prescribed by 50 P.S. 
§7111, 42 P.S. § 5944, 42 P.S. § 5929 and 28 
Pa. Admin. Code § 103.22(b)(4) and shall 
review the documents in camera for the sole 
purpose of determining whether the documents 
contain information relevant to the issue of 
the standard of care the hospital owed Shane 
Edgar to insure her safety and well being 
while she was a patient.  In the event the 
court determines that these documents do 
contain information relevant to the issue of 
the standard of care the hospital owed Shane 
Edgar to insure her safety and well being 
while she was a patient, the Court will 
direct counsel to make an effort to agree on 
a procedure to be employed during the trial 
of this case which will maintain the 
confidentiality of documents and will permit 
the use of the information. . . . 
Edgar v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., No. 94-3515, slip op. at 2 (E.D. 
Pa. July 18, 1995).  When Hahnemann failed to comply with this 
order, the Edgars moved the court to hold it in contempt. 
 On August 8, 1995, Hahnemann filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus in this court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a), seeking to compel the district court to withdraw its 
July 10 and 18, 1995 orders.  Two days later, Hahnemann asked the 
district court to stay all proceedings before it pending our 
disposition of the mandamus petition.  While the request for a 
stay was pending, the district court granted the Edgars' 
application to hold Hahnemann in civil contempt for not providing 
the district court with the contested medical records as ordered. 
Thus, it entered an order on August 14, 1995, imposing a coercive 
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fine on Hahnemann of $1,000.00 per day for each day after August 
16, 1995, that it did not comply with the July 18, 1995 order.  
The district court then denied Hahnemann's request for a stay on 
August 15, 1995, without prejudice to Hahnemann renewing the 
request in the event that we grant the petition for mandamus.  In 
denying the request for a stay, the court observed that it had 
not issued a formal ruling regarding certification under section 
1292(b).0 
 On August 28, 1995, Hahnemann filed a "Supplemental 
Petition . . . for Writ of Mandamus" in this court requesting 
that we issue a stay of the coercive fine pending resolution of 
its petition on the merits.  On September 6, 1995, we entered an 
order staying the coercive fine effective August 28, 1995, when 
the supplemental petition was filed. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 The district court has jurisdiction over the Edgars' 
diversity of citizenship action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Our 
jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to the All Writs Act, which 
provides that federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or 
                     
0[A]lthough para. 9 of [Hahnemann's Petition 
for Stay of the Proceedings] asserts `in 
releasing its July 19, 1995 Order, this Court 
declined petitioning defendant's request that 
these issues be certified for immediate 
appeal pursuant to the procedure set forth at 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)', the Court has not 
issued any ruling in this case concerning 
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). 
 
Edgar v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., No. 94-3515 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 
1995). 
9 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."  28 U.S.C. 
§1651(a).  As the district court has diversity jurisdiction, this 
court potentially has jurisdiction over the case and therefore 
has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider Hahnemann's 
petition.  Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 482 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (citing Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, 
951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 Hahnemann's petition contends that the district court's 
orders requiring it to submit for in camera review the patient 
charts of the two male patients who allegedly raped Shane Edgar 
would require it to violate the MHPA, as well as Pennsylvania's 
statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 5944 (Purdon's Supp. 1995), the Pennsylvania Patient's 
Bill of Rights, 28 Pa. Code. Ch. 103 (1983), and the 
constitutional rights of privacy of the male patients.  Our 
inquiry requires us to decide whether the writ of mandamus is the 
appropriate means of relief for the hospital to pursue and, if it 
is, to examine whether the proposed in camera review of documents 
is permissible.  The first issue, of course, implicates federal 
procedural law, and the parties correctly agree that the second 
issue should be decided under state law.  See Fed. R. Evid. 501. 
Because we hold that mandamus is appropriate in this case and 
that the MHPA as a matter of law prevents the disclosure of the 
documents relating to the male patients' psychiatric care, we 
will grant the petition for mandamus, but will not reach 
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Hahnemann's remaining reasons for contending that we should issue 
the writ. 
 
A.  The Procedural Question 
 The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that a court 
should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in response to 
an act "amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power.'"  Will v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 273 (1967) (quoting 
De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 
65 S.Ct. 1130, 1132 (1945)); Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 
426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123-24 (1976).  Given its 
drastic nature, a writ of mandamus should not be issued where 
relief may be obtained through an ordinary appeal.  Bankers Life 
& Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148 
(1953) (citing Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60, 67 S.Ct. 
1558, 1559 (1947)); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 
(3d Cir. 1992); Oracare DPO, Inc. v. Merin, 972 F.2d 519, 522-23 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Thus, in addition to the jurisdictional 
prerequisite inherent in the language of section 1651(a), two 
additional prerequisites for issuance of a writ are: "(1) that 
petitioner have no other `adequate means to attain the [desired] 
relief,' and (2) that petitioner meet its burden of showing that 
its right to the writ is `clear and indisputable.'"  Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Kerr, 
426 U.S. at 403, 96 S.Ct. at 2124, and citing DeMasi v. Weiss, 
669 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1982)); Communication Workers v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 932 F.2d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 1991).  Even 
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when these prerequisites are met, issuance of the writ is largely 
discretionary, bearing in mind "`the unfortunate consequence of 
making the . . . judge a litigant,'" Kerr, 426 U.S. at 402, 96 
S.Ct. at 2124, and the highly disfavored effect of piecemeal 
appellate review.  Haines, 975 F.2d at 89; DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 
F.2d at 117. 
 Discovery orders are not "final" for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and, therefore, ordinarily are not appealable until 
after there is a final judgment.  Haines, 975 F.2d at 83 (citing 
Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
Furthermore, we do not permit parties to litigation to circumvent 
the final judgment rule simply by resisting discovery orders and 
then appealing from an eventual finding of civil contempt.  See, 
generally, DeMasi, 669 F.2d at 122-23.  To be sure, appeal after 
final judgment constitutes "other means" of relief.  Where a 
privilege is asserted, however, such relief usually is not 
"adequate."  As we held in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 
587 (3d Cir. 1984), "[w]hen a district court orders production of 
information over a litigant's claim of a privilege not to 
disclose, appeal after a final decision is an inadequate remedy . 
. . for compliance with the production orders complained of 
destroys the right sought to be protected."  Id. at 591 
(citations omitted).  Several of our cases since Bogosian have 
reaffirmed this basic proposition.  See, generally, Glenmede 
Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home 
Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1984); Haines, 975 F.2d at 
89. 
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 Respondents and nominal respondent argue, however, that 
issuing a writ of mandamus would be inappropriate at this point 
because Hahnemann never formally petitioned the district court 
for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).0  Therefore, 
respondents contend there remains a viable and "adequate" 
alternative to the issuance of an extraordinary writ.  We 
disagree.  Hahnemann included certification language in the 
proposed order allowing in camera inspection that it submitted to 
the district court.  Nevertheless, the district court did not 
include that language in the order it entered.  While it is true 
that, "[w]here interlocutory appeal seems a practical but untried 
avenue, we will ordinarily deny a petition for mandamus," In re 
Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 774, we also have stated that 
"neither Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 nor any decision, 
Rule, or Internal Operating Procedure of this court has codified" 
a requirement to seek section 1292(b) certification before filing 
a petition for mandamus.  Id. at 773.  Furthermore, although 
Hahnemann did not formally move the district court for a section 
1292(b) certification, it is clear that it did so at least 
informally. 
 We recognize that, in a particular case, it might be 
appropriate to exercise our discretion to deny mandamus because a 
                     
0In their answer to the petition, the Edgars raised this 
objection, but they did not repeat it in their subsequently filed 
brief and, at oral argument, appeared to abandon the objection. 
We nevertheless address the point because (1) it is appropriate 
to do so in light of the standards governing applications for 
mandamus and (2) the nominal respondent has filed an answer 
raising the point. 
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formal application for certification has not been made under 
section 1292(b).  Yet where, as here, at least an informal 
application has been made and not granted, we believe it can be 
appropriate to grant mandamus, especially since we never have 
established an "inflexible pleading requirement" regarding 
section 1292(b) certification.  Id. at 774; see Alexander v. 
Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 n.8 (3d Cir. 1993).0 
Hahnemann's desired relief of maintaining the confidentiality and 
privilege of the medical records of the two male patients could 
be lost forever unless we issue a writ of mandamus.  See Haines, 
975 F.2d at 89 (writ of mandamus is only means of relief from 
order requiring production of documents allegedly subject to 
attorney-client privilege).  We therefore hold that because 
Hahnemann has no other adequate means to attain its desired 
relief, the first requirement for mandamus has been satisfied. 
 In addressing the merits of this case in an effort to 
determine if Hahnemann's right to a writ of mandamus is "clear 
and indisputable," Haines, 975 F.2d at 89, we first must specify 
exactly which order(s) of the district court are subject to 
                     
0We also point out that section 1292(b) permits a district court 
to certify an order so that a court of appeals may grant leave to 
appeal only if the district court concludes that the "order 
involves a controlling question of law . . . and that an 
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation . . . ."  It is 
conceivable that mandamus might be appropriate in a case not 
satisfying the section 1292(b) certification standard.  See 
Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d at 1422 
n.6; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.14 
(3d Cir. 1986).  Thus, we have not imposed an inflexible 
requirement that certification be sought and, if granted, leave 
to appeal be sought before a writ of mandamus may issue. 
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mandamus.  We have decided that only the July 10 and 18, 1995 
orders requiring Hahnemann to produce the treatment records of 
the two male patients are subject to mandamus.  Although 
Hahnemann has indicated in its petitions and briefs that it also 
challenges the August 14 and 15, 1995 orders respectively holding 
it in contempt and denying its motion for a stay, we find that 
those orders are not appropriate for review by mandamus.  To the 
extent that Hahnemann seeks relief from the August 15 order 
denying Hahnemann's motion for a stay, the district court's order 
is not reviewable by mandamus because the court indicated that it 
would permit a renewed motion to stay (or vacate) in the event 
that this court grants Hahnemann's writ on the merits.  As to the 
August 14 contempt order, Hahnemann has a possible alternative 
remedy that renders our issuance of a writ inappropriate: 
Hahnemann can appeal the contempt order after final judgment if 
it has paid the fines incurred between August 16 and August 28, 
1995 (the latter being the date of our stay).  Thus, we review on 
the merits only the district court's orders of July 10 and July 
18 requiring the production for in camera review of the patients' 
treatment charts. 
 
B.  The Scope of the MHPA Privilege 
 As we stated above, Hahnemann claims that the MHPA 
forbids it from producing the records of the patients who 
allegedly raped Shane Edgar to the district court.  The Act 
"establishes rights and procedures for all involuntary treatment 
of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or outpatient, and for 
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all voluntary inpatient treatment of mentally ill persons."  Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7103.  Section 111 of the MHPA provides as 
follows: 
 All documents concerning persons in 
treatment shall be kept confidential and, 
without the person's written consent, may not 
be released or their contents disclosed to 
anyone except: 
 
 (1) those engaged in providing treatment 
for the person; 
 (2) the county administrator, pursuant 
to section 110; 
 (3) a court in the course of legal 
proceedings authorized by this act; and 
 (4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes 
and regulations governing disclosure of 
patient information where treatment is 
undertaken in a Federal agency. 
 
 In no event, however, shall privileged 
communications, whether written or oral, be 
disclosed to anyone without such written 
consent.  This shall not restrict the 
collection and analysis of clinical or 
statistical data by the department, the 
county administrator or the facility so long 
as the use and dissemination of such data 
does not identify individual patients. . . . 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7111.  The purpose of the MHPA is to 
further the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania "to seek 
to assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who 
are mentally ill."  Id. § 7102.  In fact, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has given the patient's right to confidentiality of 
psychiatric records constitutional status.  See In re June 1979 
Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77-78 
(Pa. 1980) (but finding that public policy reasons may allow 
constitutionally protected records to be subpoenaed where 
appropriate protections against further disclosure are in place); 
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In re B., 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. 1978).  The Act therefore is 
strictly construed.  In re Roy, 620 A.2d 1172, 1173 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 639 A.2d 30 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. 
Moyer, 595 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 
604 A.2d 248 (Pa. 1992). 
 Section 111 of the MHPA does not create a conventional 
privilege protecting communications only if they satisfy certain 
elements.  See In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating 
Grand Jury, 415 A.2d at 76-77.  On the contrary, section 111 is 
much broader in scope, covering any document that "concern[s] 
persons in treatment."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7111.  The 
statute requires that such documents "shall be kept confidential 
and, without the person's written consent, may not be released or 
their contents disclosed to anyone except" in four listed 
situations, all having to do with psychiatric care.  Id.  That 
language indicates that disclosure of treatment records is 
forbidden unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. 
 Indeed, it appears that every Pennsylvania court in 
determining the applicability of section 7111 first has examined 
whether the situation before it constituted one of the listed 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Johnsonbaugh v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 
665 A.2d 20, 26 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) ("Petitioner has failed to 
establish that any of the statutory exceptions apply[.]").  The 
only exception that could be applied in the case before us is the 
one contained in subparagraph (3), allowing disclosure of 
confidential documents to "a court in the course of legal 
proceedings authorized by this act."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, 
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§7111.  However, this exception has been held to include only 
involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment proceedings, 
as those are the only legal proceedings authorized by the Act. In 
re Roy, 620 A.2d at 1173-74 ("[A] patient's inpatient mental 
health records may be used by a court only when the legal 
proceedings being conducted are within the framework of the MHPA, 
that is, involuntary and voluntary mental health commitment 
proceedings.") (quoting Commonwealth v. Moyer, 595 A.2d at 1179). 
 When none of the four exceptions to section 7111 of the 
MHPA applies, the Pennsylvania state courts consistently have 
denied requests for production of documents that the statutory 
privilege covers.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Moyer, 595 
A.2d 1177, a case stemming from repeated sexual assaults of a 
boy, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania overturned the 
defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court erred 
in admitting his mental health treatment records into evidence 
because they were privileged under the MHPA.  In Leonard v. 
Latrobe Area Hosp., 549 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), 
plaintiffs' mother was killed by her husband, and they brought a 
negligence action against the hospital that treated him for a 
psychiatric disorder.  The Superior Court reaffirmed that under 
the MHPA the hospital could not disclose the patient's records. 
 In Ferrara v. Horsham Clinic, 1994 WL 249741 (E.D. Pa. 
June 3, 1994), plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survival 
action against a clinic in which her daughter had committed 
suicide.  The district court denied plaintiff's motion to compel 
production of the treatment notes concerning a patient who had an 
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altercation with her daughter.  Id. at *2.  The court held that 
these documents were privileged under the MHPA and could not be 
disclosed.  Id.  In Kakas v. Commonwealth, 442 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982), a hospital employee fired for allegedly 
punching a patient subpoenaed the patient's records for his 
hearing before the State Civil Service Commission to challenge 
the dismissal.  The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Commission's 
quashing of the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the 
records were privileged under the MHPA. 
 In fact, with the exception of cases in which the 
statutory privilege has been waived by the patient, e.g., Sprague 
v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 910-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), it seems 
that a Pennsylvania court has found in only one case that the 
protection conferred by section 7111 of the MHPA should give way. 
In Fewell v. Besner, 664 A.2d 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), the 
plaintiff was committed involuntarily pursuant to the MHPA after 
becoming severely depressed over her four-month-old son's death. 
While committed she confessed to the defendant, her therapist, 
that she had suffocated her son.  Id. at 578.  Believing 
(erroneously) that state law obligated him to report child abuse, 
the therapist informed the coroner of plaintiff's confession and 
testified at her criminal trial, where she was found guilty.0 
                     
0On appeal from her conviction, the Superior Court found that the 
therapist's compelled testimony at trial violated the state's 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5944, 
but determined that the error was harmless.  Commonwealth v. 
Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  The court was 
not presented with the issue involved in the civil suit (that the 
immunity provisions trumped the statutory confidentiality 
requirements). 
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Commonwealth v. Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995).  Plaintiff then sued the therapist for violating section 
111 of the MHPA but the trial court granted the therapist's 
motion to dismiss based on provisions in the mandatory reporting 
law granting immunity from suit for those who acted in good faith 
in making a report.  On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the 
immunity provision was in conflict with the confidentiality 
requirements of section 111 of the MHPA.  The Superior Court 
disagreed.  It held that the privilege must yield to the immunity 
provisions, noting the strong policy interest evinced by the 
statutes requiring the reporting of child abuse.  Thus, the court 
essentially held that a therapist who learns of child abuse 
during therapy and is compelled to testify at a criminal trial 
will not be permitted to invoke the MHPA confidentiality 
privilege, given the competing statutory interests in the 
reporting of child abuse, and the statutory immunity from suit 
granted to those making such reports. 
 The cases we have cited make it clear that the MHPA is 
strictly construed by the Pennsylvania courts.  In the absence of 
a waiver of the privilege, in only one instance has a court held 
that a confidential document should be produced, and that case 
involved the competing statutory interests of child abuse 
reporting and good faith immunity from suit.  No such competing 
statutory interests apply here, and in any event it is not the 
place of this court to create judicial exceptions to a 
Pennsylvania statute that has been strictly construed by the 
state's courts.  See Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 
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101 (3d Cir. 1994) (federal court in diversity case ought not to 
stretch state common law). 
 In spite of the state courts' strict interpretation of 
the MHPA, however, the Edgars argue that Pennsylvania could not 
possibly have intended to require confidentiality under the 
circumstances presented in this case.  Additionally, they 
complain that the policy the statute seeks to promote --
encouraging treatment by ensuring confidentiality -- is not 
advanced by strict adherence to the statutory language of the 
privilege in this case.  Again, while the Edgars may raise 
plausible policy arguments against the legislative wording of the 
statute, we are obliged to follow the statute as written and 
interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts.  The MHPA presents an 
absolute confidentiality privilege against the disclosure of 
documents that "concern[] persons in treatment."  The 
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the wording of the statute 
strictly.  While in a particular case, a litigant may challenge 
documents for which protection is claimed as not meeting the 
"concerning persons in treatment" standard, that situation is 
clearly not present here, since the documents we are considering 
are the treatment records of the two men accused of raping Shane 
Edgar.0 
                     
0We doubt that a hospital can make an unreviewable ex parte 
determination that a document concerns a person in treatment and 
thereby refuse to disclose documents for an in camera review, 
intended in the first instance to determine if the document is 
confidential according to section 111.  If a hospital could 
sustain that position, it would be able to withhold documents 
that might not reasonably be covered by the section.  We, 
however, are not concerned with a situation of that nature here. 
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 Further, unlike conventional privileges that apply only 
to certain communications, section 111 of the MHPA creates a much 
broader protection, forbidding the disclosure of any document 
"concerning persons in treatment" regardless of the contents of 
that document.  Thus, it is possible that documents receiving 
protection under the MHPA may not contain material that would be 
privileged under any other statutory or common-law privilege. 
Nevertheless, as long as the documents concern persons in 
inpatient psychiatric treatment (voluntary or involuntary), 
section 111 of the MHPA absolutely forbids their disclosure 
except in the enumerated circumstances.0  The in camera 
inspection of such documents by the district court in this case 
does not fall within one of those exceptions.  We have no further 
inquiry to make. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 We therefore hold that Hahnemann's right to a writ of 
mandamus is clear and indisputable, and that the district court 
exceeded its authority in compelling the hospital to produce the 
charts of the two male patients.  Consequently, we will grant the 
writ of mandamus and direct the district court to vacate the July 
10 and 18, 1995 orders compelling production of the patients' 
records for in camera inspection and possible disclosure. 
                     
0As we have indicated, the MHPA applies to "all involuntary 
treatment of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or 
outpatient, and [to] all voluntary inpatient treatment of 
mentally ill persons."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7103.  We are 
not concerned here with tortious conduct of outpatients. 
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However, we will deny Hahnemann's supplemental petition for a 
writ of mandamus on the issues of the petition for a stay of the 
district court proceedings and the district court's contempt 
order.  The parties shall bear their own costs on these mandamus 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
